SYSTEMD-CRYPTSETUP(8)

NAME
systemd-cryptsetup, systemd-cryptsetup@.service - Full disk decryption logic

SYNOPSIS

systemd-cryptsetup [OPTIONS...] attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [KEY-FILE] [CRYPTTAB-OPTIONS]

systemd-cryptsetup [OPTIONS...] detach VOLUME

systemd-cryptsetup@.service

system-systemd\x2dcryptsetup.slice

DESCRIPTION

systemd-cryptsetup is used to set up (with attach) and tear down (with detach) access to an encrypted block device. It is primarily used via systemd-cryptsetup@.service during early boot, but may also be called manually. The positional arguments VOLUME, SOURCE-DEVICE, KEY-FILE, and CRYPTTAB-OPTIONS have the same meaning as the fields in crypttab(5).

systemd-cryptsetup@.service is a service responsible for providing access to encrypted block devices. It is instantiated for each device that requires decryption.

systemd-cryptsetup@.service instances are part of the system-systemd\x2dcryptsetup.slice slice, which is destroyed only very late in the shutdown procedure. This allows the encrypted devices to remain up until filesystems have been unmounted.

systemd-cryptsetup@.service will ask for hard disk passwords via the password agent logic[1], in order to query the user for the password using the right mechanism at boot and during runtime.

At early boot and when the system manager configuration is reloaded, /etc/crypttab is translated into systemd-cryptsetup@.service units by systemd-cryptsetup-generator(8).

In order to unlock a volume a password or binary key is required. systemd-cryptsetup@.service tries to acquire a suitable password or binary key via the following mechanisms, tried in order:

    1. If a key file is explicitly configured (via the third column in /etc/crypttab), a key read from it is used. If a PKCS#11 token, FIDO2 token or TPM2 device is configured (using the pkcs11-uri=, fido2-device=, tpm2-device= options) the key is decrypted before use.

    2. If no key file is configured explicitly this way, a key file is automatically loaded from /etc/cryptsetup-keys.d/volume.key and /run/cryptsetup-keys.d/volume.key, if present. Here too, if a PKCS#11/FIDO2/TPM2 token/device is configured, any key found this way is decrypted before use.

    3. If the try-empty-password option is specified then unlocking the volume with an empty password is attempted.

    4. The kernel keyring is then checked for a suitable cached password from previous attempts.

    5. Finally, the user is queried for a password, possibly multiple times, unless the headless option is set.

If no suitable key may be acquired via any of the mechanisms describes above, volume activation fails.

CREDENTIALS

systemd-cryptsetup supports the service credentials logic as implemented by ImportCredential=/LoadCredential=/SetCredential= (see systemd.exec(5) for details). The following credentials are used by "systemd-crypsetup@root.service" (generated by systemd-gpt-auto-generator) when passed in:

cryptsetup.passphrase
    This credential specifies the passphrase of the LUKS volume.

    Added in version 256.

cryptsetup.tpm2-pin
    This credential specifies the TPM pin.

    Added in version 256.

cryptsetup.fido2-pin
    This credential specifies the FIDO2 token pin.

    Added in version 256.

cryptsetup.pkcs11-pin
    This credential specifies the PKCS11 token pin.

    Added in version 256.

cryptsetup.luks2-pin
    This credential specifies the pin requested by generic LUKS2 token modules.

    Added in version 256.

SEE ALSO

systemd(1), systemd-cryptsetup-generator(8), crypttab(5), systemd-cryptenroll(1), cryptsetup(8), TPM2 PCR Measurements Made by systemd[2]

NOTES

1.  password agent logic
    https://systemd.io/PASSWORD_AGENTS/

2.  TPM2 PCR Measurements Made by systemd
    https://systemd.io/TPM2_PCR_MEASUREMENTS